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Abstract

Cyber Warfare is widely touted to be the next generation of warfare. As America’s
reliance on automated systems and information technology increases, so too does the
potential vulnerability to cyber attack. Nation and non-nation states are developing the
capability to wage cyber warfare. Historically, the Air Force and DoD have concentrated
their efforts toward defensive network operations. However, a shift in doctrine has
shown both the Air Force and DoD acknowledging the potential for Information Warfare.
What appears to be lacking is the trained and educated cyber warrior force that will carry
out the information operations if needed. This research project examines the doctrine of
DoD and national agencies to engage in information operations and efforts in place to
train cyber warriors. In turn, this research project offers recommendations for a career
development and progression model for an Air Force Cyber Warrior force.
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ESTABLISHING A CYBER WARRIOR FORCE

I. Introduction
Background
Information warfare (IW) is real. The threat is real. The potential for conflict
centered around IW appears real.
The competition for information is as old as human conflict. It is virtually a
defining characteristic of humanity. Nations, corporations, and individuals each
seek to increase and protect their own store of information while trying to limit
and penetrate the adversary's…As information systems permeate our military and
civilian lives, we are crossing a new frontier - the Information Age. It will define
the 21st century and influence all we do as an air force. Information Warfare has
become central to the way nations fight wars, and will be critical to Air Force
operations in the 21st century. [1]

These viewpoints were taken from Cornerstones of Information Warfare, dated
1995. Nearly ten years ago, Air Force leadership recognized the future trend toward IW.
Even the current Air Force Chief of Staff, General John Jumper, sees IW as an integral
part of Air Force operations. “I picture myself around that same targeting table where
you have the fighter pilot, the bomber pilot, the special operations people and the
information warriors. As you go down the target list, each one takes a turn raising his or
her hand saying, I can take that target” [2]. Will America ever see an actual information
war? Who knows…these key military leaders certainly appear to think it’s a real
possibility and one the Air Force needs to prepare for. But what exactly is IW?
According to the USAF Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for Information Operations
11

(IO), IW is defined as, “The theory of warfare in the information environment that guides
the application of information operations to produce specific battlespace effects in
support of commander’s objectives” [3]. A more broad definition however, comes from
Dr Ivan Goldberg, researcher of information warfare, who says
Information warfare is the offensive and defensive use of information and
information systems to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy, an adversary's
information, information-based processes, information systems, and computerbased networks while protecting one's own. Such actions are designed to achieve
advantages over military or business adversaries. [4]
Vulnerabilities
But why has information warfare become such a threat? Possibly because of the
value of information as stated above. It may also be due to the fact that America is so
dependent on information that it makes us vulnerable to attack. In 1998, it was estimated
that 62 million Americans used the Internet to communicate, bank, shop, and do business
[5]. And today there are over 200 million Americans on-line [6]. And not only are
civilians vulnerable to IW due to their heavy reliance upon information and information
systems, but the United States has a technologically advanced military who are also very
connected. That dependence however, also leaves us vulnerable as well. “…a
combination of cost concerns and the superiority of established commercial systems have
created a situation in which an estimated 95 percent of all military communications travel
over commercial systems” [7]. So not only is the average American susceptible to an
information attack, but so is the military.

12

Threats
So is IW the only real threat? That’s probably a difficult question to answer
absolutely, however there are several authorities who feel it would be difficult to match
the United State’s and their allies’ military might.
Without doubt, the United States is the primary superpower in the world today.
The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the coalition
victory in Iraq have all demonstrated the military dominance of U.S. forces.
Despite substantial forces reductions in recent years, the United States and the
Western European Allies will likely remain the most powerful military powers in
the world for the near future. [8]

A common theory among many military leaders and strategists is that China is the
only remaining serious military threat to the US. However, according to a recent
Pentagon report [9], there’s even speculation as to whether or not their military might is
capable of matching ours. The report stated, “…China’s leaders believe their military
forces are not yet strong enough to compete directly with the American military.”
Consequently, China has embarked on a new strategy they think may help level the
playing field. Specifically, “the concept appears to include a range of weapon systems
and technologies related to information warfare…” which makes the threat of IW even
more real. From that, one could easily conclude there’s little threat of conventional war
against the United States. Unfortunately however, that means the threat of asymmetrical
warfare, in particular information warfare, remains real. According to the U.S. Army’s
Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare, “…asymmetric warfare deals with unknowns, with
surprise in terms of ends, ways, and means. The more dissimilar the opponent, the more
difficult it is to anticipate his actions...” [10]. And with America’s heavy dependence on
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information and technology, IW becomes a very logical means for an adversary to exploit
that dependence.
Not only are nation-states like China actively pursuing the cyber domain and the
potential it offers, but information attacks and the ease with which they can be carried out
appear to be of great interest to terrorist organizations as well. Al Qaeda is said to be
engaged in the information warfare arena. Richard Clarke, former Special Adviser for
Cyberspace Security, said of Al Qaeda, “…these people are gathering skills in cyber war
capability…I think it suggests that someday we may see Al Qaeda, if it's still alive and
operating, use cyberspace as a vehicle for attacking infrastructure -- not with bombs, but
with bytes” [11]. And he’s not alone in his opinion. Analysts with iDefense, purportedly
the nation's only independent cyber intelligence company, claim Malaysia is one of the
newest breeding grounds for cyber terrorists with the United States being one of their
primary targets [12].
This information tends to support the theory that IW is a distinct possibility.
Several senior military leaders clearly stated their beliefs that IW is the way wars will be
fought in the future, the question is, are we ready? This research project examines that
question. It looks at how the Air Force and DoD have shifted their doctrine from a
defensive posture to one which includes offensive information operations. This project
examines how several Air Force career fields train and qualify their individuals and uses
key elements of those processes to recommend a career development and progression
model for an Air Force Cyber Warrior force.
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II. Current Situation
Defensive Posture
So how prepared is the United States and its military to defend against an
information warfare attack? Much of that is up for speculation, but clearly based on
comments from past and present Air Force leadership, they’ve had IW in their crosshairs
for the last decade. However, considering efforts dealing with military network
operations, they have focused primarily on the defensive aspects of network operations,
labeled NetD, for network defense [13]. Several years ago, the Air Force realized the
significance of the cyber threat that exists and took proactive steps to address it. In 1997,
Air Force leaders conceived the notion of a new philosophy toward their networks and
information systems. In January 1998, they formalized that notion and established a
program entitled Operationalizing and Professionalizing the Network (OPTN) in order to
apply the same operational rigor toward Air Force networks that the Air Force uses with
weapons systems. OPTN established a structured, hierarchical management system with
operations centers at the base, major command, and Air Force levels. It offered a
structured training and equipping philosophy in an attempt to follow the lead of weapons
systems. OPTN also adopted mainstream operational reporting of Air Force network
statuses and graduated response measures in the event of an information attack.
Although the focus was heavily process-oriented, it began to address the key concerns
Air Force leadership had toward defending Air Force networks from outside attacks [14].
In 1998, then Air Force Chief of Staff, General Mike Ryan, articulated this even more
clearly in a memorandum which stated “We continue to experience incidents on our
networks which reinforce the need for improved network protection.” He went on to
15

direct actions to install defensive network monitoring tools and procedures to improve the
security of Air Force networks [15]. The Department of Defense (DoD) made an even
louder statement about the importance of network security that year when they activated
a new joint service operations center to manage military networks called the Joint Task
Force (JTF) for Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND). Their primary focus,
“…coordinating and directing the defense of DoD computer systems and computer
networks,” was ensuring the integrity and availability of those networks and keeping
potential adversaries out [16].
With the OPTN structure still relatively new, the Air Force sought to beef up their
approach to defending its networks by integrating more robust and dynamic network
defense systems into them. Firewalls, proxy servers, and intrusion detection systems all
became common place in network control centers around the world. However, dissimilar
systems were surfacing which caused configuration management problems and ultimately
weakened the overall security. The lack of centralized funding caused major commands
and individual bases to fend for themselves with end-of-year monies to procure as much
defense as they could. However, in 2000 the Air Force formalized their stance on
network defense by directing the standardize purchase and installation of the Network
Management System-Base Information Protection suite of hardware and software [17].
Although funding was still sparse, this step showed the Air Force was making an earnest
effort to address the issue of defending the precious nature of information systems.
In addition to targeting the multitude of management and security issues
associated with running networks, the OPTN effort discovered training to be a significant
hurdle. Training was, and still is, one of the greatest challenges facing Air Force leaders
16

as they attempt to get networks operating as weapons systems. OPTN created a network
operations crew structure with specific duties to emulate the aircrew system seen in
aircraft and operations centers. These crews would man the base-level network control
centers and major command network operations and security centers with several
positions created specifically for network defense, such as boundary protection and
intrusion detection. Career field managers for the communications and information
career fields began adding network defense training in enlisted 5-, and 7-skill level
technical schools to prepare them for their new crew-oriented duties. While the basic
courses addressed boundary protection and intrusion detection, advanced courses covered
topics such as reconnaissance, malicious logic, and the insider threat [18].
Communications and information officers were also receiving the basics in network
warfare, information operations, security and availability in their initial and mid-level
training schools, further showing the Air Force’s emphasis on the importance of properly
defending their networks [19].
A Shift Toward Offensive Operations
However, for nearly a decade, the Air Force and DoD have seen a shift in strategy
to include offensive information operations. Lessons learned from the exploits of
information and information systems during Operation DESERT STORM had already led
the Air Force to create the Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC). Although its
mission did not initially include offensive operations, the creation of the AFIWC signaled
an awareness that the Air Force saw the direction of future warfare. Several year later
however, the AFIWC roles did shift to be the Air Force lead for developing tactics and
17

training for offensive and defensive counterinformation [20]. But, the Air Force’s Global
Engagement document, created in 1996, included Information Superiority as a new core
competency for the Air Force. It defined Information Superiority to be “…the capability
to collect, process, analyze and disseminate information while denying an adversary's
ability to do the same.” The definition alone implies an offensive capability when it talks
of “…denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.” And the document goes on to state
“The Air Force will aggressively expand its efforts in defensive IW as it continues to
develop its offensive IW capabilities” [21]. The Air Force went on to formalize the
inclusion of Information Operations in the spectrum of future warfare by creating Air
Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5, Information Operations, in 1998. In it is stated:
“The Air Force believes information operations include actions taken to gain, exploit,
defend, or attack information and information systems.” Had there previously been any
doubt about Air Force views of offensive information operations, AFDD 2-5 made them
clear [22]. Yet another signal that the times were changing was when the joint services
organization responsible for command and control warfare (C2W), the Joint Command
and Control Warfare Center, was redesignated the Joint Information Operations Center in
1999. C2W is “The integrated use of operations security, military deception,
psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually
supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy
adversary command and control capabilities…” [23], in which there is no mention of
offensive information operations. However, their new mission is now the integration of
Information Operations (IO) into military plans and operations across the spectrum of
conflict, where IO is defined as “…actions taken to affect adversary information and
18

information systems while defending one's own…” This signaled the inclusion of IO
tactics and capabilities into Joint operational war plans [24]. Equally significant, the
JTF-CND was also redesignated as the JTF for Computer Network Operations in 2001
and was explicitly given the new mission of Computer Network Attack (CNA) [25].
Where their previous mission was exclusively “…defense of DoD computer systems and
computer networks…” [26], it explicitly stated “The CNA mission is to coordinate,
support and conduct, at the direction of the president, computer network attack operations
in support of regional and national objectives.” The Air Force continued its refinement
of information operations and continues to show an increasing trend toward offensive
operations. In February 2004, the Air Force published the Concept of Operations for
Information Operations (IO CONOPS). In it, the CONOPS specifically addresses
network attack operations (NetA) as a capability for future combat operations which
would be integrated into existing conventional planning. NetA is defined in the
CONOPS as “…the employment of network-based capabilities to destroy, disrupt,
corrupt or usurp information resident in or transiting through networks” [27].
Additionally, AFDD 2-5, is in its final rounds of coordination and also includes network
attack as an integral part of the Air Force’s mission.
What appears to be missing from this clear shift in offensive operations is any
mention of who will implement them. The Air Force is structured in a way that offensive
weapons are employed by officers flying weapons systems. This project continues that
premise and creates a career force development model to produce qualified officers to
employ offensive information weapons.
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III. Methodology
Overview
Having provided background into vulnerabilities from America’s dependence on
information and information systems, and the potential threat of future information
warfare, the next logical step may very well be determining how the Air Force creates the
cyber warrior force needed to defend and fight those potential cyber wars. But before
that question can be answered, it’s necessary to familiarize the reader with the
methodology and terminology used in the development of this report. Although this
research effort is not based on the results of laboratory experimentation, the same
structured methods used to develop a well organized experiment are applied here as well.
To assist in this development, the structured approach identified by Raj Jain in his book,
The Art of Computer Systems Performance Analysis [28] is followed. If implemented,
this approach will aid in determining the effectiveness of the model and the factors
applied during implementation.
Goal
The goals of this project are to develop and document a proposed model for
officer career development and progression within Information Operations, specifically,
Network Warfare Operations (NW Ops). This model includes recommendations for
education, training, experience and assignment types, all necessary components for
producing a qualified Air Force cyber warrior force. This model can be used to support
future offensive network attack operations.
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Approach
The approach used to produce this NW Ops professional development model
includes the analysis of other career field progression models. Specifically, the specialty
fields of acquisition, medical, space operations and rated operations are examined in
order to ensure any recommendations for the NW Ops workforce made are consistent
with proven mainstream Air Force processes. Although the development of an NW Ops
career force may be a new proposal, this approach does not depart from established
processes. Based on these analyses, a solution is recommended for developing Air Force
NW Ops personnel from accession through senior leader positions. The author is keenly
aware of the significant challenges associated with changes in a system as large and
complex as that of the Air Force, to include the substantial investment required to adopt
these changes. However, due to the scope of this project, it is difficult to address in
sufficient detail all the resource requirements, whether personnel or finances, needed to
implement any potential recommendations made here.
System Boundaries
With the goals and the approach stated, it’s important to define the scope of the
model. In this project, it is initially tempting to define the boundaries of the system under
test as the Air Force in its entirety, since the Air Force has the ultimate effect on the
success or failure of this effort. However, that definition quickly becomes unwieldy as
one tries to determine how to manage all the many facets of the Air Force. It was also
tempting to limit the system to only the individuals who may pursue the NW Ops career
force. But that proved too limiting when analyzing the parameters which affect them.
21

Based on that, the definition for the system defined by this project is the elements of the
Air Force which have a significant effect on the individuals, namely the personnel
system, assignment system, training system, and the organizations cyber warriors are
assigned as reflected in Figure 1. Using the model which Jain defines as a system, that
leaves the individual as the component under study or test.

NW Ops Career Force

System
UnderModel
Test
Development
Assignment System

Workload

(

Personne System

\ Component *
Under Test

(Tasks levied)
*

Services

„

(Education, training
experience, qualifications)

Individual
*

Training Syste m

Organi ations

Figure 1 – System Boundaries
System Services
Regardless of how a system is defined, each system provides one or more services
which a user can request. The same holds true for this research effort. Having
established the system as the individual and the elements of the Air Force which directly
affect them, the services generated by the component under test, the individual, are of
greatest interest. The services generated by them are simply the education, training,
experience, and qualifications of the individual which make them capable of defending
Air Force, or DoD networks, or attacking those of their adversaries as necessary.
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Workload
In general, the workload for a system is defined as a list of service requests. For
the system identified in this report, workload is the demands placed on the individual as
they progress through the career force process. These demands include education and
training demands during periods of qualification, and various tasks levied upon them to
demonstrate their proficiency or execute network defensive or offensive actions.
Performance Metrics
Performance is a key criterion in the design of any system. Performance is also
key to the system and the processes ultimately proposed in this report. With the
component under test identified as the individual, performance measures must be created
to determine the success of individuals as they progress through their careers. Several
metrics could potentially measure that success, but for the purposes of this effort, those
listed below are used.
− Time required to meet qualification standards for assigned special experience
identifier (SEI). Unit of measure: months per SEI (categorized by SEI)
− Number and types of SEI obtained. Unit of measure: SEI(s) obtained (based on
final SEI categories)
− Successful completion of assigned training or education. Unit of measure:
Training/education module pass rate (ratio of successful modules / modules
attempted)
− Successful completion of incremental performance measures (e.g. checkrides,
exams, etc.) Unit of measure: Check ride or exam pass rate (ratio of successful
check rides or exams / check rides or exams attempted)
− Successful career progression (rank attained before separation) Unit of measure:
Categorical unit of final rank attained
− On-time promotion success. Unit of measure: On-time promotion rate (ratio of
on-time promotions / promotion boards met)
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System Parameters
Parameters are defined as characteristics which affect the performance of the
system. Parameters can either be system parameters, which directly apply to the system,
or workload parameters, which vary the workloads. Although not an all-inclusive list,
system parameter which could possibly affect the performance of the individual include:
− Previous experience. The experience an individual has upon entering the NW
Ops career force can have a significant effect on their success. Whether obtained
from a former career field or through personal study and experience, those skills
could enhance their ability to learn additional skills or progress through their
training or assigned tasks.
− The Air Force Assignment System. Aligning the individual with proper
assignment which will afford them the opportunity to train and develop their skills
will certainly affect their success.
− The Air Force Personnel and Finance Systems. Overall, the Air Force Personnel
System has a significant affect on the potential success of an individual. In
addition to assignments, other programs, to include pay, allowances, and
incentives, which in turn affect the morale of the individual (whether financial or
not) can affect the success of their career.
− Supervisors. Supervisors can also affect the success of an individual. If not
appreciated, or recognized for their efforts, individuals can easily become
disenchanted with the Air Force which in turn could affect their success. Also,
supervisors have a great deal of control over training allocations and other
opportunities which may impact the success of an individual.
− Air Force Budget. Changes in the Air Force budget can affect the training dollars,
equipment, systems, etc., available at the unit level which can ultimately affect an
individual’s success.
− Deployments. Similar to assignments, deployment opportunities can have both
positive and negative affects on an individual and in turn potentially impact their
success.
− Training and education demands. Coursework, performance evaluations, and
examinations are all items which can clearly affect the success of the individual.
The intensity or frequency of these can ultimately determine an individual’s
ability to perform.
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Workload Parameters
Since workloads for this project are the service requests levied on the individual,
changes in those demands can clearly affect the success of the individual. Workload
parameters include:
−
−
−
−
−

Educational requirements
Training demands
Evaluations
Examinations
Performance tasks

However, when considering the definition of the system and component under
test, it tends to lend itself to the performance tasks as being the only real demand placed
on the individuals. Since the personnel, assignment, and training systems are all part of
the larger system under test, the other parameters above are better suited as system
parameters and are included there.
Factors
As with parameters, factors are also characteristics which affect the performance
of the system. Factors are essentially the subset of parameters which are varied in order
to see the resulting outcomes. If the recommendations of this report are implemented,
factors need to be identified in order to see the impact on the process and its individuals.
The factors the author feels would be the most applicable to the system and processes
proposed in this report are Previous Experience and Training/Education demands. Since
the NW Ops career force manning will initially come from existing career fields, it would
be worth studying to see how well the various individuals in various positions succeed
based on their backgrounds. Additionally, it would be worth determining how much
25

education and training the individuals need to perform the tasks levied upon them as
requirements of the cyber warrior force are better defined.
Evaluation Technique
The evaluation technique is the method or methods in which the system is tested
to accomplish the goals of the experiment. Techniques include mathematical modeling,
computer simulations, and direct measurement. The selection of the right technique
depends on the time and resources available to measure it. The most appropriate
evaluation technique for this model would be direct measure. Unfortunately in this
project, the timeframe needed to collect many of those metrics will span several years. It
may be possible to generate a computer simulation which could predict some aspects of
these processes, but that would have to be addressed in a separate study.
Experimental Design
Using direct measurements as the technique, this experiment produces a succinct
design which minimizes the complexity. In many experiments, there are multiple factors,
and multiple levels of each, which can be varied to perform the experiment. The typical
experiment is done in two phases, where in the initial phase multiple factors are tested,
but with a small number of levels. In the second phase, a subset of factors are tested, but
at increased levels. In this project, there are only two factors recommended, which
facilitates the execution of it. However, considering the multitude of options for the
education and training factor, it’s possible to scope a more complex experiment if
additional considerations need to be addressed.
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Likely candidates for inclusion in the cyber warrior force, include
Communications and Information personnel, Intelligence personnel, Engineers, and
possibly others. Considering those career fields, a reasonable division of backgrounds or
previous experience, may very well be the Communications and Information career field
(33Sx), compared with all others. Likewise, another possible division of previous
experience may be those with technical undergraduate degrees, compared with those
without (provided individuals are selected who didn’t complete technical undergraduate
programs). This report is advocating that all individuals considered for the cyber warrior
force complete technical undergraduate programs, but determining their success with or
without one may be a useful result of this experiment. This report proposes to arrange
the experiment based on varying the previous experience category by previous career
field, and undergraduate program. Additionally, this report proposes to vary the
education and training factor by adjusting the amount of network and security
fundaments offered. Individuals with backgrounds in networking or security may be
successful without reaccomplishing those areas.
Below is a simple matrix that shows proposed combinations of factors to scope
the experiment.
Table 1 - Experiment Design
Previous experience

Completed network and
security education and
training.

Comm and Info (33Sx)
With technical undergraduate degree
Without technical undergraduate degree
All Other career fields
With technical undergraduate degree
Without technical undergraduate degree

27

Bypassed network and
security education and
training.

Analyzing and Interpreting Results
Upon completion of the experimental data collection of the performance metrics
above, this project proposes an analysis on the factors to determine the effects caused by
each. The analysis will use a full-factoral design to determine if there is any significant
difference in the success of individuals, using the categories matrixed in table 1. The
effects will be analyzed for their significance and interactions. These results will allow
career field managers to tailor the education and training tracks to produce the most
effective system to produce cyber warriors
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IV. Analysis
Creating The Force
The next step to consider is how the Air Force should proceed to create a cyber
warrior force. It must be stated at this point that a great deal of effort across the Air
Force has been directed toward the development of an information operations career
force. In March of 2003, the Air Force approved the Information Operations Strategic
Plan which was created to “…increase IO capability and effectiveness through a
combination of doctrinal, programmatic, and organizational improvements” [29].
Additionally, the Air Force created the IO Implementation plan, “…to provide a process
to integrate IO capabilities and provide the warfighter with a viable means to achieve
non-kinetic effects” [30]. A key aspect of the plan was the creation of the Information
Operations Steering Group (IOSG). The IOSG oversees the myriad of issues dealing
with information operations, to include the task of creating an IO career force. The IO
Strategic Plan, based on direction from Defense Planning Guidance 04-09 (DPG 04-09),
directed the IOSG to develop an Air Force IO career force [31] . DPG 04-09 directed all
component services to create a professional IO force, but did not specify details on how it
was to be done. Although the IOSG will address the IO career force in its entirety,
covering electronic warfare operations, network warfare operations, and influence
operations, the scope of this project will only address network warfare operations,
specifically network defense (NetD) and network attack (NetA).
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Personnel System Issues
The efforts of IOSG have not only wrestled with what the professional
development requirements for a new IO career force should be, but also those of the
personnel system in order to manage newly trained IO career force professionals. One
important point from the IO steering group efforts is that they advocate what could be
considered as part-time IO professionals who will move in and out of IO billets rather
than remaining in them through their career [32]. Additionally, the IO roadmap also
recommends that personnel identified to work information operations receive tours that
would alternate them between information operations jobs and those of their traditional
career field [33]. However, others advocate an entirely different shift in perspective, that
of a truly professional full-time information operations force. Through his research on
this subject at Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), Major Jonathan Sutherland
concluded about the part-time IO approach, “Sending a college graduate to the field for a
few tours of general expertise interspersed with training classes and then expecting firstrate information techniques in a more specialized tour later is not adequate” [34]
The development of a truly professional force is essential to ensuring these
individuals receive the training, assignments, and leadership opportunities to be
successful in their careers. Those advocates recommend this be done by the creation of a
new Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) which would completely identify them as a
separate career field. However, the IOSG maintains that individuals will remain in their
existing AFSC but receive a Special Experience Identifier (SEI) as a means to identify
the specialized IO experience they’ve gained. Regardless of whether a new AFSC is
created or not, this report advocates that individuals be trained, tracked, and managed as
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information operations professionals, and that they not be rotated or alternated through
assignments, or ever be considered part-time.
Determining Force Size
One thing that may be agreed upon is that irrespective of how the individuals are
coded and tracked, there will likely be no new forces to access into the IO career force.
According to the Air Force Chief of Staff, “By the end of 2005, we should reduce the size
of our active force by 16,000 people…” [35]. Consequently, all individuals identified to
be IO career course professionals will undoubtedly come from existing forces. Naturally
there may be some hesitation among career field managers to release individuals from
their existing career fields to populate this new IO force. Unfortunately, the reality may
be that if the Air Force wants to ensure a truly professional force, that’s a level of pain
that needs to be endured.
A difficult step in making that happen is determining the exact numbers to
populate the career force with. Typically the Air Force mans specialties based on
specific organizational requirements or by inventory (based on a specified percentage of
the force) [36]. To facilitate the management of the new NW Ops career force, this
report recommends an inventory-based approach until the NW Ops career force has the
opportunity to mature and potentially drive more refined requirements. Likely sources or
career fields to draw from would be the communications and information career field,
intelligence career fields, or engineering career fields. However there are undoubtedly
individuals in a multitude of career fields who possess the fundamental skills or
educational background to easily transition into the information operations career force
31

area. One possibly approach may be to survey the Air Force to find these individuals.
Regardless of the source, a key to successful development of the NW Ops career
force will be the correct balance of education, training, assignments, and job experience.
The information warrior must know not only programming but systems
integration and systems theory, communications, security, artificial intelligence,
logic in all its many forms (classical, fuzzy, and convergent), and statistical
techniques. The information warrior must also know the customer’s needs: the
commander’s intent, doctrine, and strategy. The amount of information necessary
to be an information warrior is immense, and the time required to master it would
have to be at the expense of a more general command instruction. [37]
Referencing Other Career Field Models
Acquisition
The right balance of these areas is certainly not new to the Air Force, nor other
career fields. For example, the acquisition community has categorized all positions and
all assignments by certification level. They’ve done this in an effort to ensure that only
fully trained and qualified personnel occupy those critical billets. They’ve also included
the prerequisite education requirements to fill those assignments and the job experience
requirements to gain additional certifications if necessary to remain in them. They have
well-established courses all individuals must attend at various levels which prepare them
for the job responsibilities commensurate with those certification levels. Senior leaders
in the acquisition community must not only meet the highest level of certification, but
they have additional statutory requirements that must be met [38].
Medical corps
In the medical corps, they too have a multitude of educational and job
requirements to ensure their force is professionally trained and qualified. In addition to
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the minimum education requirements of medical school, they must complete a minimum
of one year of graduate training and examinations in order to obtain a medical license for
the state in which they practice. Beyond that, they need an additional three years of
training to be a fully qualified doctor. In addition to clinical experience, they are required
to complete approximately 50 hours of continuing education units per year just to
maintain their state license. As they advance through their career and attain advanced
specialties, they may complete board certifications for those added specialties. With each
certification comes a list of criteria they must meet in order to retain them. In addition to
state and board certification requirements, each clinic or hospital may specify skills
requirements specific to their facility and position. Proficiency is maintained through the
numbers and types of procedures they complete in clinical practice, and the arduous peer
and senior staff review process they participate in. Lastly, advanced education is strongly
emphasized as well. At any point in time, there are approximately 25 percent of all
doctors in graduate education programs [39].
Space Operations
An interesting development in the space operations career field recently is the
establishment of a space warrior cadre. The 2001 Space Commission contended Air
Force and DoD Space Operations personnel were not adequately trained or educated and
“…are not yet on course to develop the space cadre the nation needs.” As a result, the
space operations career field is undergoing a change in how they train, educate, and
manage their space professionals. Similar in design to that of the acquisition career field
model, all space operations billets will be reviewed and identified for required experience
and certification levels to work them. They too will create a three-tiered certification
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system in which individuals will progress from accession through senior leadership
positions. At each level, will be a mandatory course which will provide them the
necessary education to fill assignments at that level. And similar to how the IOSG has
advocated special experience identifiers to track IO career force professionals, they will
create specialty codes, or specs, in order to manage individuals based on the various
specialties that they attained [40].
Rated Operations
Lastly, in looking at the rated operations career field, one sees what may
understandably be the most stringent technical training requirement in terms of war
fighting proficiency skills. Each pilot completes undergraduate pilot training which
qualifies them for initial training into their weapon system. At their weapon system entry
school, they receive initial qualification training (IQT) where they learn the systems and
operations, to include all facets of emergencies. This training entails many hours of both
simulator and aircraft flying time. They complete numerous check rides which combine
both open and close book examinations, covering both normal and emergency
procedures. This rigorous training ensures pilots are proficient in the critical skills
necessary to execute their duties in a wartime environment. At their first duty station,
they proceed through mission qualification training (MQT) where they develop the
proficiency to fly the aircraft through all facets of its designed capabilities and to employ
all the weapons systems equipped on that aircraft. They are also required to maintain
currency by flying a pre-determined number of hour in training sorties which are
representative of the mission of the aircraft and its weapons systems. The next steps in
their career are potentially those of advanced flying positions to include aircraft
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commander, for multi-pilot systems, instructor pilot, or evaluator. The best of the best
have the opportunity to go on to the Air Force Weapons School and become experts in
weapons employment [41, 42].
Assessment and Recommendations
Having assessed a variety of career fields and their processes for developing their
professionals, this report recommends one for the network warfare operations specialists.
This recommendation essentially combines many of the key elements from those above.
As with all the career fields, it includes timely training and educational opportunities at
key points in an individual’s progression to ensure their knowledge and skills are
commensurate with the level of assignments they’ll hold. Specifically, it includes an
initial NW Ops course to offer both the theoretical and practical fundamentals of NW
Ops which individuals will need to step into their first assignment. Additionally, this
recommendation includes check rides and annual standardization examinations, as used
by the rated operations career field, to ensure individuals are able to perform the tasks
they have been deemed qualified to perform or to employ the weapons they are qualified
to employ. Lastly, it also includes the requirement to complete continuing education
units, like the medical career field, to ensure they remain current since the pace of
technology change is so rapid.
NW Ops Officer Requirements
The first step in the development of the NW Ops career force is to determine, as
much as possible, the requirements individuals will need to execute the mission of
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network defense or attack, and thus to be successful in their careers. Joint Publication 313 identifies the following as expectations of IO professionals [43].

Figure 2 – IO Officer Functions

These requirements are levied on all IO professionals regardless of specialty.
Clearly, they focus very heavily on the roles of planning, execution and support to a joint
forces commander (JFC). It seems evident that the training and experience necessary to
be effective at that level is extensive. Additionally, the DoD IO Roadmap further identify
the types of knowledge and skills the individuals must possess by stating, “IO capability
specialists should possess specialized expertise on a certain IO core capability, but gain
experience in the planning and execution of the broader construct of IO” [44]. Based on
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these expectations, this report attempts to identify the education, training, and experience
requirements for NW Ops professionals to perform at these levels.
Undergraduate Requirements
Prior to their acceptance in the NW Ops career force, potential candidates should
have a technical undergraduate degree. It’s not essential that they complete an
engineering or computer science degree, but it’s important that their undergraduate
program be technical in nature, and includes several engineering or computer science
courses. This technical undergraduate program will aid the individual in their completion
of the initial NW Ops course.
Initial NW Ops Course
To begin the pursuit of the NetD and NetA specialties, individuals must
understand the fundamentals of the environment and technologies in which they work.
This is accomplished through a rigorous course, or courses, which provide the foundation
upon which the NW Ops specialists will build. Although HQ ACC/SCN is working on
potential course requirements, this report includes recommendations on the subject matter
the courses need to address. Table 2 outlines the course content for the initial NW Ops
course.
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Table 2 – Initial NW Ops Course Content
Initial Network Warfare Operations Course Material Content
Fundamentals of Information Warfare (IW)
AFDD 2-5
Information Operations (IO)
Influence Operations (Influence Ops)
Electronic Warfare Operations (EW Ops)
Network Warfare Operations (NW Ops)
Legal/Ethical Aspects of IO/IW
Terrorism/Antiterrorism
C4ISR
Space Systems
Air Operations Center (AOC) Operations
Operational Campaign Planning
Operations Security (OPSEC)
Fundamentals of Network Operations
Network Operating Systems
Network Management Principles
Network Infrastructure Devices
Networking Protocols
Air Force Enterprise Networking
IO/IW Threats, Vulnerabilities, Methodologies, and TTPs
Emission Security (EMSEC)
Communications Security (COMSEC)
Computer Security (COMPUSEC)
Security Management
Access Control Models
Social Engineering
Operating Systems Fundamentals and Vulnerabilities
Software Vulnerabilities
Distributed System Security
Secure Application Development
Malicious Logic and Scripting
Telephones System Vulnerabilities
Infrastructure Devices and Vulnerabilites
Wireless Technologies and Vulnerabilities
Data Integrity
Encryption
Network/computer Forensics
Firewalls
Proxy Servers
Intrusion Detection Systems
VPNs

Completion of the NW Ops course is a critical lead into the NW Ops career force.
Clearly the scope of the material covers all aspects of IO to ensure individuals understand
the broader IO discipline. Later in their NW Ops career, individuals will have the
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opportunity to attend the intermediate NW Ops course where the emphasis will
concentrate more on IO planning. However, during the initial NW Ops course,
individuals will concentrate more on the technical aspects of NW Ops, addressing only
the fundamental elements of EW Ops and Influence Ops. The initial NW Ops course will
offer sufficient depth into networks, network security, and the elements of NW Ops
necessary for individuals to be prepared for the demands placed on them upon
graduation. It will include adequate hands-on training with standard Air Force
equipment, systems, and applications so individuals will easily transition into the
operation of live networks at their next assignment.
Career Path
The initial NW Ops course is simply the first step in a long progression of
assignments and training opportunities which ultimately leads to a qualified and
proficient NW Ops career force. Not all individuals will follow the same path, nor will
all individuals attain the same levels of rank or career success. Although there is no set
track an individual must follow, there are elements of assignments which will allow
individuals the opportunity to be successful. Below are templates for assignment types
and levels which individuals should attempt to follow to become successful NW Ops
specialists.
First Assignment
Upon completion of the initial NW Ops course, personnel report to their first duty
location. Table 3 lists typical assignment types that individuals should receive for their
first assignment out of the initial course.
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They will receive additional education and training to learn the specific mission of
their unit and parent major command, and at that point are considered initially qualified
and enter mission qualification training (MQT). MQT will entail qualifying for one of
the special experience identifiers in the network control center NetD positions. That
qualification will include several check rides and examinations with certified evaluators.
Table 3 - Typical NW Ops First Assignments
Typical First Assignments
Base Network Control Centers (NCC)

Performance Requirements
Systems and emergency procedures checkout
(IQT)
MQT – gain NCC NetD position qualification
and SEI
Qualification and annual checkrides

Combat Communications Squadrons
Other Communications and Information Officer
Aerospace Communications Education billets

Annual standardization and emergency
procedures exams
Currency through CEUs

Also at their first assignment, they need to acquire continuing education units to
ensure they remain current and knowledgeable on trends and technologies relevant to
network warfare issues. Qualified individuals will demonstrate their proficiency at least
annually through performance checkrides and annual standardization examinations.
Second Assignment
Upon reaching their second assignment, individuals will again be required to
complete local check rides that will cover emergency procedures in addition to
organizational and major command mission specifics tasks. Table 4 lists typical
assignment types that individuals should be considered for as second assignments.
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Table 4 - Typical NW Ops Second Assignments
Typical Second Assignments
Network Operations and Security Centers (NOSC)
Information Warfare Flights (IWF), Information
Warfare Squadrons (IWS), Information Warfare
Aggressor Squadrons (IWAS)
Air Force Network Operations and Security Centers
(AFNOSC)
Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team
(AFCERT)
Battle Labs

Performance Requirements
Systems and emergency procedures checkout
Gain additional NetD/NetS position
qualifications and SEIs
Learn offensive network operations TTPs
Upgrade to instructor or evaluator
Participate in operational exercises (e.g.
Red/Blue Flag, Black Demon, etc.)
Qualification and annual checkrides
Annual standardization and emergency
procedures exams
Currency through CEUs

Their second assignment may include earning additional special experience
identifiers in any of the network defense or network support categories, or they may
begin to learn and practice offensive network tactics techniques and procedures. Based
on the rate at which they're able to progress, they may also begin to qualify as trainers or
evaluators. This would also be a prime opportunity for individuals to look to participate
in operational exercises, such as Red or Blue Flags or Black Demon, that would allow
them to apply the knowledge and skills they have gained. During this assignment, they
will again be subjected to multiple check rides, including annual examinations, to ensure
they maintain their skills and proficiency. They will also complete the required
continuing education units to ensure they remain current with network warfare
technologies and vulnerabilities.
Third Assignment
The third assignment offers qualified personnel opportunities to possibly branch
out and explore other areas of network warfare operations. Table 5 lists typical
assignment types that individuals should be considered for as third assignments.
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Table 5 - Typical NW Ops Third Assignments
Typical Third Assignments
Competitive programs like SOS, EWI, AFIP, AFIT
Executive Officer
Staff action officer or IO planner (MAJCOM, NAF,
DRU, FOA levels)
Instructor duty: Initial NW Ops course
Intermediate NW Ops Course student
Air Operations Center Course student
Air Force Weapons School student

Performance Requirements
Emergency procedures checkout
Gain additional NetD/NetS position
qualifications and SEIs as applicable
Qualification and annual checkrides
Upgrade to evaluator or developer of TTPs
Participate in operational exercises (e.g.
Red/Blue Flag, Black Demon, etc.)
Annual standardization and emergency
procedures exams
Currency through CEUs
Staff IO planner

They may be afforded the opportunity to attend Squadron Officer School inresidence, or programs like Education With Industry (EWI), the Air Force Intern
Program, and the Air Force Institute of Technology. They may also have the opportunity
to serve as an executive officer, or in other highly selective positions. Timing would also
put them in the window to gain additional training in the Intermediate Network Warfare
Operations Course, Air Force Weapons School, Air Operations Center Course, or other
courses such as those at the Joint Special Operations University [45]. Depending on their
proficiency and rate of progression, they may be given the opportunity for assignment as
a school house instructor at the initial NW Ops course. Toward the end of the third
assignment they may transition into an IO planning function if co-located with a
Numbered Air Force (NAF) or Major Command (MAJCOM) Headquarters. Again, they
should take every opportunity available to participate in operational exercises to reinforce
their skills and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). They may also participate
with, or on, staff entities as evaluators or developers of the TTPs that network warfare
operations personnel use. As qualified NW Ops specialists, they will again be expected
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to complete continuing education units, annual standardization examinations, and
checkrides.
Intermediate NW Ops Course
After their first two or three assignments, NW Ops professionals should have the
opportunity to attend the Intermediate NW Ops Course. This course will build on the
material taught in the Initial NW Ops Course and the experience individuals gain in their
early assignments. The course will offer advanced offensive NW Ops TTPs, and will
emphasize IO planning, to include all aspects of IO. As individuals become more senior,
this course will assist them in their transition to IO planning assignments. Table 6
outlines the recommended course content for the Intermediate Network Warfare
Operations Course.
Fourth Assignment
The fourth assignment will offer many similar opportunities as those of the third
assignment, depending on what individuals have done to this point in their career. Table
7 lists typical assignment types that individuals should be considered for as fourth
assignments.
Table 6 – Intermediate NW Ops Course Content
Intermediate Network Warfare Operations Course Material Content
Terrorism/Antiterrorism Intelligence Update
Current Trends in IO/IW Threats, Vulnerabilities, Methodologies, and TTPs
AFDD 2-5
Legal/Ethical Aspects of IO/IW
Advanced Concepts in Information Operations (IO)
Air Operations Center (AOC) Operations
Operational Campaign Planning
Offensive NW Ops TTPs
IO Planning and Execution
Influence Operations (Influence Ops)
Electronic Warfare Operations (EW Ops)
Network Warfare Operations (NW Ops)
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Table 7 - Typical NW Ops Fourth Assignments
Typical Fourth Assignments
Many of the same types as for third assignments,
plus:
Flight Commander
Highly selective programs like IDE, EWI
IO planner (NAF/MAJCOM/HAF/Joint HQs levels)

Performance Requirements
Currency through CEUs
Staff IO planner
Upgrade to evaluator or developer of TTPs

As more senior members, they may have the opportunity to fill key leadership
billets such as flight commander. Additionally, they may have the opportunity to attend
Intermediate Developmental Education (IDE) opportunities such as ACSC, the Air Force
Institute of Technology or the Naval Postgraduate School. This is also the right time to
look toward participation on NAF, MAJCOM, HQ Air Force (HAF), or Joint
Headquarters staffs to perform IO planning and staff functions.
Fifth Assignment
The fifth assignment will be an even more senior assignment that may include
IDE, instructor duty, at either the Initial or Intermediate NW Ops courses, or Air Force
weapons school, or such typical jobs as an IO planner or staff member at various Agency,
HAF or Joint Headquarters levels. They may also be able to attend additional courses
such as the Senior Information Warfare Applications Course [46].
Subsequent Assignments
Their sixth and subsequent assignment opportunities are increasingly more senior and
take on additional leadership roles and responsibilities. These may provide the
opportunity to compete for squadron command, or attend Senior Developmental
Education opportunities, the Joint Information Warfare Senior Officers Course at the
National Defense University, or participate as the senior staff member involved in IO
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doctrine at MAJCOM, HAF or Joint Headquarters levels. Individuals at this point in
their careers should be looked upon as the senior experts in all aspects of IO, not only
NW Ops. Figure 3 shows a notional career planning diagram for Network Warfare
Operations specialties.

Initial NW Ops Course

# Personnel – TBD

NW Ops Career Planning
Diagram

Tactical

Occupational Skills Pairings:
Intel
Space
Plans and Programs
Education and Training

Intermediate
NW Ops (other)
Course(s)
Operational

BDE Window
IDE Window
Strategic
SDE Window

5

Tactical
NCCs
Combat Comm
ACE Lt billets
IWS/IWAS
NOSCs
Battle Labs

10

15

Operational
AFNOSC/AFCERT
Staff (MAJCOM, NAF, DRU, FOA)
Instructor
Weapons School
Staff (HAF, JCS, Joint Other)
Flt/CC, Sq/DO, Sq/CC
Developmental Assignment

20

25

30

Strategic
Staff (HAF, Joint, MAJCOM)
Staff (OSD, JCS, COCOM)
GP CC/CV
Developmental Assignment
NDU

Figure 3 – Network Warfare Operations (NW Ops) Career Planning Diagram

45

V. Conclusion

Several senior military leaders and strategists have supported the idea that future
information warfare is a distinct possibility. The threat exists not only by nation states,
but also by non-nation terrorist organizations, and has been substantiated by national
security and international terrorism experts. For nearly ten years, the Air Force and DoD
have written IO concepts into key documents acknowledging the potential of future IW.
For most of that decade, the Air Force and DOD have focused on a defensive posture to
protect themselves from the potential of an information warfare attack. However, there
has been a clear shift in philosophy which includes integrating offensive information
operations into operational doctrine and war plans. What appears to be lacking however,
is the trained and qualified information operations force with the expertise to prosecute
an information war or employ offensive information weapons. Last year, the Air Force
activated the information operations steering group whose charter is to address the wide
range of issues dealing with information operations to include the creation of an IO career
force. Their efforts however, do not call for a separate IO force, but rather individuals
from other specialties who receive IO training. Additionally, the IOSG advocates
alternating assignments between an individual’s original career track and IO billets.
Having assessed several existing Air Force career fields, the recommendation from this
report is to create a new NW Ops career force who specialize in IO activities for their
entire career. This report also proposes a career development and progression model
which outlines the types of assignments and performance expectations individuals should
follow to produce a trained and qualified NW Ops career force.
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